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COUNTRY_		_  (1
TOPIC		
EVALUATION	PLACE OBTAINED.	25X1
DATE OF C	DNTENT	
DATE OBTAI	NEDDATE PREPARED11 January 1950	
REFERENCE		
PAGES	ENCLOSURES (NO. & TYPE)	
REMARKS_		25X1
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		25X1
1.	the air force units stationed 25X1	
25X1	at the KOETEME (M 52/D 95) airfield had about 400 supply personnel, about 150 kommandatura and administration personnel	
	and about 400 flying and ground personnel on 29 October 1949.	25X1
X1	had allegedly come from GROSSENHATN (N 52/	25/1
X1	A 01) in late August 1949. The kommandatura, motor vehicles	
	Soviet pilot regiment stationed in "ITTENBERG (N 52/T 37).  Capt. CHIKOV was the administration officer of the kommandatura.	
	The flying units consisted of a unit equipped with single-	
	engine low-wing monoplanes, a unit equipped with twin-engine semi-high-wing monoplanes, a weather station equipped with	
5X1	four to six biplanes and a training unit equipped with 15 to 20 biplanes. A total of 80 aircraft at most were allegedly	
	stationed at the field.	
2.	The same local resident also stated that on 29 October 1949,	0574
		25X1 25X1
•	!"earwhile, the administration officers were responsible for the communi-	
	cation between the Soviet troops and the German civilian agencies	
5X1	and used a list in which the Soviet units were characterized.  The German agencies learned	25X1
	list.	
3.	There was no flying between 29 October and 4 November 1949 because of bad weather except on 2 November when local flights	
	were made.	
4.	Alert take-offs were repeatedly practiced in rainy weather	
	between 5 November and 11 November 1949. The ground personnel hurriedly removed the tarpaulins from the aircraft which were	
	taxied to the take-off point in echelons of 8 to 10 planes.	
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Judging by the speedy take-off run it was considered impossible

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that the engines had been run warm. Some aircraft took off from the hangars. After a take-off run of about 1,000 feet the engine ran idle and the planes taxied back into the hangers. All aircraft were usually parked in the hangers at night. They were towed out of the hangers in the morning and the engines were run up whether the planes were to take off or not. biplanes were repeatedly observed taking off in the late evening and landed about midnight when the field searchlights were in operation. Another 30 bombs of about 150 kg each were piled at the ammunition dump on the southern edge of the field. The dump was brightly illuminated at night. 25X1 Comment: The data in para 1 on the occupation of the field by Soviet units cannot be rated for lack of comparable information. It is, however, generally considered credible since the arrival of units from GROSCENEAUM (ground attack units) and the appearance of motor vehicle 25X1 25X1 have been confirmed 25X1 reconnaissance regiment and a ground attack regiment are assumed to be stationed in KOETIEN. The presence of meterological aircraft is considered credible since they were reported [ | 25X1 25X1 in august 1949. It is assumed that the meteorological aircraft are assigned to the air reconnaissance regiment. Capt CHIKOV is not known. 25X1 The observed alert wake-off practices show that the fighters can apparently take off without warming their engines (method of cold take-off). confirm the presence of ground attack units in GROSSE HAIN.

